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1
Overview: The History,
Present Scope, and
Future Implications for
Legal Competency

A. THE HISTORY OF THE .RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN COMPETENCY AND THE LAW

As

is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, the legal system worldwide has
dealt with questions of competency in criminal law for centuries, dating to at
least mid-seventeenth cenn1ry England, 1 perhaps for even 400 yea.rs before that. 2
Other questions of competency date to the time of the Code of Hammurabi. 3
Social historians tell us that the relationship between competency and issues related to psychiatric hospitalization was first considered some 2,500 years ago in
the Twelve Tables of Rome. 4 The question of the relationship betvveen civil law
and competency is similarly venerable: Guardianship has ancient origins in Roman and English common law, for example, as does the law ofwills. 5 These, in

1. See Bruce Winjck & Terry DeMeo, Competency to Stand Trial in Florida, 35 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 31, 32 n.2 (1980).
2. See RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND 1luAL 10 (1980).
3. See Thomas R. White, Oaths in Judicial Proceedings and Their Effect Upon the Competency of
Witnesses, 51 U. PA. L. REv. 373, 375, 395 (1903).
4. See 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAw: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 2A2. la, at 46 (2d ed. 1999), citing THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 6 (F. Lindman &
D. McIntyre eds. 1961).
5. See, e.g., Patricia McManus,A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Approach to Guardianship ofPersons 1vith Mild Cognitive Impainnent, 36 SETON HALL L. REv. 591 (2006) (guardianship); 3 SIR
WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 541 -44 (3d ed. 1923) (wills).
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short, are inquiries that have concerned lawyers, mental health professionals, and
policymakers for centuries.
Yet, in at least two of the three major substantive areas with which this volume
is concerned, the most important developments in competency and the law have
come within the past 35 years-in the landmark cases ofJackson v. Indiana 6 and
Rivers v. Katz. 7 In Jackson-a case nominally involving the competency to stand
trial of a crinunal defendant who was profoundly mentally retarded, deaf, and
mute-the U.S. Supreme Court, for the first time, applied the due process clause
to all matters involving the nature and duration of commitment to psychiatric
institutions. 8 In Rivers-a case nominally about a civil patient's right to refuse
the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications-the N.Y. Court of
Appeals seriously considered the relationship between an individual's competency
and his right to exercise autonomy in institutionally based decision-making. 9 The
impact of both of these cases transcended the circwnstances of the narrow legal
issues presented, and, in effect, opened the courthouse doors 10 to multiple new
inquiries about competency in all relevant aspects of public law.
Simultaneously, researchers and behavioral scholars law1ehed a series of complex, multi jurisdictional studies designed to illununate the multiple layers of competency, to better w1derstand the relationship between competency and mental
illness, between competency and decision-making, and between competency
and the legal process. These studies-many of which were undertaken under the
aegis of the MacArthur Foundation-shone new light on the cli.Jucal concepts
involved in legal competency decisions and clarified the relationslups between
competence and mental illness, concluding that mental patients are not always
i.J1competent to make rational decisions and that mental patients are not inherently more incompetent than nonrnentally ill patients. 11 In fact, on "any given
measure of decisional abilities, tl1e majority of patients with scrnzophrenia did not
perform more poorly than otl1er patients and nonpatients:' 12 By way of example,
the judicial presumption that tl1ere is botl1 a de facto and de jure presun1ption of
6. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
7. 495 N.E. 2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
8.Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.
9. Rivers, 495 N.E. 2d at 341-42.
10. Cf David Bazelon, Veils, Values and Socia/Responsibility, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 115, 115
(1982) (courts should "open the courthouse doors" to mental health professionals but "never
hand over the keys").
11 . Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Outpatient Commitment: I&ndra's LaJV
as Case Study, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 183, 193-94 (2003), relying on, inter alia, Paul S.
Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatrnent Competence Study. I: Mental Illness
and Competence To Consent to Treatment, 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 105 (1995); Thomas Grisso
et al., The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. II: Meamres ofAbilities Related to Competence To Consent to Treatment, 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 127 (1995); Thomas Grisso & Paul S.
Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III: Abilities of Patients To Consent to
Psychiatric andMedical Treatments, 19 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 149 (1995).
12. Grisso &Appelbaum, supra note 11, at 169.
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incompetency to be applied to medication decision-making appears to be based
on an empirical fallacy13; psychiatric patients are not necessarily more incompetent than nonmentally ill persons to engage in such independent medication
decision-making. 14
Also, state legislatures began to consider questions of competency in their
efforts to create new solutions to vexing legal-social-clinical problems (e.g., the
proliferation of so-called "assisted outpatient treatment" laws, most famously
exemplified by New York's Kendra's Law; 15 the creation of so-called "ProblemSolving Courts" such as drug tream1ent courts or mental health courts, which are
conceived as ways of diverting certain individuals from the criminal justice system
into more treatment-focused tribunals; 16 and the proliferation of sexually violent
predator laws, mandating civil commitment following completion of terms of
criminal sentences. 17
In addition, scholars have increasingly begun to turn their attention to "therapeutic jurisprudence?' Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) presents a model by which
we can assess the ultimate impact of case law and legislation that affects individuals with mental disabilities. Therapeutic jurisprudence studies the role of the law
as a therapeutic agent, recognizing that substantive rules, legal procedures, and
lawyers' roles may have either therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences, and
questions whether such rules, procedures, and roles can or should be reshaped
so as to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process
principles. 18 Several researchers have focused the therapeutic jurisprudence lens
directly on questions of competence in matters related to criminal and institu-

13. See, eg., M ichael L. Perlin, "You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks»: Sanism in Clinical
Teaching, 9 CLINICALL. REv. 683,696 (2003) (Perlin,Lepers)(discussing li terarure); Michael L.
Perlin, "Maize Promises by the Hour ": Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46
DEPAUL L. REv. 947, 973-74 (1997) (same).
14. Perlin, sitpra note 11, at 194; see generally, Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study: Legal and Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 137 (1996).
15. See, eg., N.Y. MENTAL HYG . LAw §9.60(5)- (6) (constirutionality upheld in In re K. L.,
806 N .E.2d 480 (N.Y. 2004)).
16. See, eg., Pamela M. Casey & David B. Rottman, Problem-solving Courts: Models and
Trends, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 35 (2005).
17. See, eg., 1 PERLIN, mpra note 4, § 2A-3.3, at 75-92.
18. Mid1ael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw": The Impact of the ADA on the I nstitutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REv. 193, 228 (2000).
See generally, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David B.
Wexler ed . 1990); ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J.
Winick eds. 1991); LAw IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds. 1996); THERAPEUTIC JumsPRUDENCE APPLIED : ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAw (Bruce J. Winick ed. 1997).
T he scope of therapeutic jurisprudence now goes far beyond questions of mental disability
law. See, eg., 1 PERLIN, supra note 4, § 2D-3, at 540 nn. 133-43 (discussing applications ofTJ
to, inter alia, domestic violence law, family law, labor arbitration, wor~ers' compensation law,
probate law, and policies about disclosure of sexual orientation).
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tional law, 19 and courts are also beginning to consider principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence in deciding cases and rewriting court rules. 20
It is certainly reasonable to anticipate that this confluence of case law, behavioral investigation, legislative action, and scholarly ferment will continue and will
expand in the future. 21

B. FUTURE GROWTH
We can confidently predict tl1at these areas of law and psychology will continue
to evolve in future years. As we discuss in the subsequent parts of tlus book, it
is entirely foreseeable that competency-related case law will continue to grow
in the areas of criminal procedure (especially in matters involving [a] the pretrial process, 22 [b] post-guilty verdict stages, 23 and [c] the deatl1 penalty), 24 sexually violent predator laws, 25 the laws related to psychiatric institutionalization
(tl1e relationship between competency and, variously, civil commitment, 26 tl1e
right to refuse treatment, 27 and deinstitutionalization, especially as tl1at relates to
the Americans with Disabilities Act), 28 correctional law as it relates to questions
of inmate discipline and segregation, 29 and tl1ose areas of civil law that focus on
trusts and estates, 30 contractual obligations, 31 domestic relations,32 and guardianslups.33 In short, we expect that tlus will be a growth area for the foreseeable
future.

19. See, e.g., Bruce Arrigo, & Jeffrey Tasca, Right to Refuse Treatment, Competency to be F,xecuted, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: ToJVard A Systematic Analysis, 24 L. & PsYCHOL. R:Ev. 1,
1-47 (1999); Patricia McManus,A Therapeutic J urisprudential Approach to Guardianship ofPersons JVith Mild Cognitive Impairment, 36 SETON HALL L. R:Ev. 591 (2006); Richard Barmun &
Thomas Grisso, Competence to Stand Trial in Jiwenile Court in Massachusetts: Issues of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFIN EMENT 321 (1994); Bruce J. Winick,
Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Betiveen Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L.
Rev. 15, (1991 ).
20. See, e.g., Amendment to the Rules of Ju venile Procedure, Fla. R . Juv. P. 8.35 0,
804 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 2001); In re Mental Health ofK.G.F., 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001).
2 1. See infra C hapter 1 B.
22. See infra Chapter 2 D 1.
23. See infra C hapter 2 D 3.
24. See infra Chapter 2 H.
25. See infra Chapter 2 G.
26. See infra Chapter 3.
27. See infra Chapter 3.
28. See infra C hapter 3.
29. See infra Chapter 3.
30. See infra C hapter 4 C.
31. See infra Chapter 4 B.
32. See infra Chapter 4 D.
33. See infra Chapter 4 E.
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C. WHY THE QUESTION OF COMPETENCE IS SO
IMPORTANT TO MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS

1. Introduction
Because mental health professionals are often called upon to assist the court in its
determination of competency, the way that competency is defined by the law is of
great interest. In order to accomplish a forensic assessment of any kind, the first
task of the examiner is to w1derstand the legal question . The definitions provided
by the law (What is the meaning of"insanity"? What is the standard for involUntaty civil commitment? Does a person need to be "competent" to enter into a
contractual relationship with another?) may incorporate terms that are ambiguous or concepts that have disparate meanings when used in clinical settings. 34
To clarify the focus of the examination, the mental health examiner must operationalize the concept or term so that its functional components can be identified for evaluation. 35 For example, the term "reasonable appreciation of available
pleas" is ambiguous and must be conceptualized by examining the functional
capacities at play. Is it enough to be able to name the pleas, "guilty" and "not
guilty?" Or should the accused be expected to know each plea and the nature and
quality of the evidence that would justify that plea, along with likely consequences
of entering the plea? What constitutes a reasonable appreciation? Is it sufficient
to memorize the answers, through participation in a program designed to restore
competency, or must the person be able to demonstrate an actual tmderstanding
of what each plea means? 36

2. Legal Implications
When the mental health examiner has operationalized which competency is to be
assessed and has accomplished the assessment, the resulting opinion may have
significant implications that may involve incarceration, court-ordered treatment,
or, potentially, the death penalty. 37 The legal concept of competency may embrace
values or principles held by society; clearly, the legal implications of a finding of
"competent-or-not-competent" are reflections of society's determination about
who should and who should not be held responsible for their own behavior. 38
34. Or terms, such as "insanity;' that are no longer used in clinical settings. See, e.g., Richard
Lowell Nygaard, On Responsibility: Or, the Insanity ofMental Defenses and Punishment, 41 VILL.
L. REv. 951, 955 n.11 (1996) ("the word insanity anachronistically survives in our legal vocabulary, notwithstanding the fact that this construct has no medical counterpart ").
35. See ThoMAs GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES 22, 52-54 (2d ed. 2003).
36. See generally infra Chapter 2.
37. See infra Chapter 2 H.
_38. See, for example, GRISSO, mpra note 35, at 477: "An expert opinion that answers the
ult1111ate legal question is not an 'expert' opinion, but a personal value judgment. No ai11olmt
or type of empirical ai1d scientific information alone can answer the question of legal competence, because the degree of ability required for legal competence is not definitive, absolute, or
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These value determinations are beyond the expertise of mental health professionals and are best left to the law. The mental health professional can offer an opinion
about whether the individual possesses the capacities identified as operational definitions of the legal construction of competency, and can explain the basis of the
opinion, but the mental health professional must then stop short of making the final step-whether the individual is, as a matter of fact, competent. That is a determination to made by the law. Put simply, an opinion regarding competency is not
a finding of competency-the ultimate issue is the determination of the court.

3. Clinical Implications
Clinical implications of an individual's competency to stand trial are irrelevant
when they are wunoored from the legal context. That is, incompetence to stand
trial is not a clinical condition that requires treatment or for which there is an
established intervention regimen. 39 An infinite number of clinical conditions may
contribute to incompetence to stand trial, including cognitive impairment such as
mental retardation or brain disorders that may have an impact on a person's reasoning ability or memory, as well as those conditions of psychosis that may distort
the individual's reasoning ability or capacity for interpersonal communication or
impair contact with reality to such an extent that the person cannot properly assist
counsel's efforts to mount a defense. 40
Th;se conditions, in and of themselves, each have clinical implications apart
from the competency question. There may be a need for ongoing medication
management, inpatient or outpatient treatment, or special support and assistance
for independent living. A clinical condition-the nature of which contributes to
a judicial finding of incompetence-is not, standing alone, the basis for the finding. 41 Competence assessment hinges on specific functional deficits, which may be
consistent across cases; see also, GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE
CouRTS, §1.04 (2d ed . 1997), and id. at 17:
[A]lthough the range of opinions with which mental health professionals provide the
courts should be narrowed to exclude opinions of a purely moral or legal namre, the door
should be left open to professional opinions, including formulations of legally relevant
behavior, that might assist (as opposed to overwhelm) the trier of fact. At the same time,
mental health professionals should be careful to indicate the level of scientific validity or
certainty attached to their opinions.
The use of the word responsible in this context is used in a far broader sense than simply whether
a defendant is to be held criminally responsible for an act because of his or her mental state.
39. On the confusion that persists in this specific area of the law and policy, see Perlin, supra
note 18.
40. On the question of the ability of the defendant to assist counsel, see 4 PERLIN, supra note
4, § 8A-2.3, at 23-24 (2d ed. 2002).
41. See Perlin, supra note 18, at 202-08 (on how findings of incompetence to stand trialregardless of severity of crime or defendant's clinical condition - leads to lengthy instin1tionalization in maximum security facilities, often ones inappropriate and coumertherapeutic for the
defendant).
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present along with each of a number of clinical conditions, but which also may be
absent in the cases of other individuals suffering from the same clinical conditions.
For example, one person who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia may be so affected by delusions that she believes her attorney has entered into a conspiracy
with the prosecutor to bring about her imprisonment. This suspiciousness may
cause her to withhold critical information from her attorney, information that
would clearly assist in her defense. By contrast, another person suffering from
paranoid schizophrenia may have periods oflucidity that allow for active participation in the defense effort, or delusions focusing on a specific group of feared
persecutors, excluding defense cow1sel who are-instead-trusted. The diagnosis
of a psychiatric condition is, itself, insufficient to establish incompetence. 42

4 . Constraints Potentially Limiting Adequacy of Assessment
A forensic mental health assessment is a snapshot of the examinee's functioning
at a specific time and with regard to whatever functional capacities are at issue.
The clarity of the image depends on the tools available-the snapshot may be a
fuzzy image when the functional capacities are ill defined or difficult to measure.
The sources of data may also limit the examiner-a defendant may be w1willing
to cooperate by answering questions, may try to control the outcome by faking
incapacity, or may be so disturbed or cognitively impain.:d that it is not possible
to reasonably assess understanding. Medication may affect performance in the
examination. 43
Conditions of the assessment may be less than optimal in other ways-examinations conducted in noisy visiting areas of jails, or in attorney consultation
areas with glass separating exanuner and defendant, may constrain assessment. 44
Language barriers, cultural differences, or mistrust bred of mental illness may
interfere with commtmication. 45 There are sometimes pressures to complete an
assessment in a short time, or access to the exan1inee may be limited so that the
42. See 4 PERLIN, supra note 4, § SA-2.3, at 20- 22 (discussing levels of mental ctisability
that, in and of themselves, have, in certain cases, not been seen as a sufficient basis for an incompetency fincting).
43. On the guestion of whether a currently incompetent defendant may be involuntarily
medicated so as to make him or her competent to stand trial, see infra Chapter 2 A 1 d.
44. The Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing ( 1999), autl1ored by tl1e American
Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, and National Council
on Measurement in Education notes that psychologists are obligated to create a testing environment relatively free of distractions. Standard 5.4 states, "The testing environment should
furnish reasonable comfort and minimal disa·actions?' Id. at. 83. Many test manuals also include
a statement to tl1is effect'in tl1e instructions for administration. For example, tl1e WAIS-III
Manual states, ''As a rule, no one otl1er tl1an you and tl1e exa.n1inee should be in tl1e room
during the testing." See DAVID WECHSLER, WESCHSLER ADULT INTELLIGENCE SCALE-Ill 29
(1997).
45. Mark D. Cunningham, The Role ofthe Forensic Psychologist in Death Penalty Litigation, preS~nted Ja.nua.ry 19, 2007, at the American Academy of Forensic Psychology Continuing Education Workshop Series, in San Diego, CA (PowerPoint slides of paper un file witl1 autl10rs).
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assessment must be accomplished in one or two visits when several would have
been ideal. Third-party information, a staple of forensic assessment, may be limited. Records of previous functioning, earlier evaluations, school and medical
records, and other objective sources of data are generally consulted, and this timeconsuming process, in the absence of adequate consent to access information,
requires a court order, further protracting the process.
Finally, the rate of reimbursement for competency assessment may be insufficient to encourage some skilled practitioners to participate in them, and may
drive those who do the assessments to give them less than their due. When a
10-hour assessment might be barely adequate, for example, the established rate
of reimbursement may be more nearly the hourly rate for 2 hours of the clinician's time. While it is asswned that a clinician who agrees to do a competency
evaluation will provide the time and attention required to do an adequate job, it
is na"ive to assume that the rate of reimbursement will not have an in1pact, directly
or indirectly, on tl1e quality of examinations available to tl1e court. Court clinics
employ forensically trained evaluators who provide tl1ese assessments in many
urban communities, potentially resolving this tension. The advantage of having
trained and experienced examiners available to do tl1e assessments may be somewhat compromised, however if caseloads are unreasonable. Additionally, there is
the risk tl1at clinic staff may become enmeshed with the process of prosecution
and lgse their neutrality. 46

5. Informed Consent on the Part of the Examinee 47
The process of gaining informed consent-a knowing and volw1tary decision
to participate in a proposed treatment-raises several considerations when competence is being assessed. First, tl1e exan1inee whose competency is at question
cannot be assw11ed to have tl1e capacity to knowingly evaluate tl1e proposed
treatment. In some cases, tl1e examinee may have limitations that could exert
an impact on the capacity of tl1e exan1iner to understand some aspects of the
informed consent discussion. Even cognitively w1impaired litigants may not be
able to anticipate the consequences of refusing to participate in tl1e assessment,
of discussing uncharged offenses, or of admitting to or denying a juvenile adjudication record that is understood to have been sealed. It is with counsel that
tlus informed consent discussion must first occur, so that counsel can carefully
evaluate the potential impact of eacl1 prong on the defendant's position and make
the informed decision about whether to go forward with tl1e assessment as it is
being described. Second, volw1tariness, in the true sense of the concept, is not

46. On the futility of demanding authentic "neutrality " in many such settings, see Michael L.
Perlin, "They're An Illusion To Me Now": Forensic Ethics, Sanism and Pretextuality, in PSYCHOLOGY, CRIME AND LAw: NEW HORIZONS AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (David Canter
& Rita Zukauskien eds. 2007) (in press).
47. See infra Chapter 4 A 1.
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totally possible when the assessment is court ordered; generally, it the rare examinee who volw1tarily decides to w1dergo an assessment of competency. Whether
the examiner is legally obligated to obtain informed consent or the examinee is
legally capable of giving it, the examiner may be ethically obligated to ensure
that the examinee or the legal representative of the examinee has had the opportunity to contemplate the nanire and potential consequences of the examination
and has had time to raise any objections. 48 Prof. Kirk Heilbrun has wisely used
the term "Notification of Purpose" to describe the process by which an involuntary examinee is notified of the elements that would normally be included in
informed consent. 49

6. The Difference between Expert as Forensic Witness and Expert
as Therapist
Forensic examination and clinical examination and treatment are two distinctly different kinds of mental healtl1 services. Historically, tl1e courts have often relied on
testimony from medical and mental healtl1 treatment providers to assist in making
determinations of matters important to ilie administration of justice. As it becan1e
increasingly common to invoke expert testimony in a wide variety of court cases,
the profession of forensic examination began to take shape. Mental health professionals-whose data include tl1e patient's self-report-became increasingly aware
tl1at an assessment for a court matter differed significantly from an assessment for
clinical purposes. so In ilie clinically driven examination, tl1e examinee or the examinee's guardian (if one has been appointed) often initiates tl1e examination and
treatment to relieve suffering. The examinee is often, but not always, cooperative,
and may stand to benefit from tl1e treatment, specifically by gaining relief from
some debilitating condition. 51 The examination and treatment generally occur in
tl1e context of a trusting relationship and some assurance of confidentiality. The
cost may be borne by tl1e examinee or a tl1ird party witl1 whom the examinee has
an established relationship, such as a guardian, employer, or insurance provider.
Participation in the service generally remains volw1tary and ilie exan1inee or service recipient can expect to benefit or to leave ilie treatment relationship if no
benefit accrues, if trnst falters, or for any reason.
48. APA Ethics Code, 3.10 Informed Consent (c), "When psyd10logical services are court
ordered or otherwise mandated, psycholog ists inform the individual of the nantre of the anticipated services, including whether the services are court ordered or mandated and any Limits of
confidentiality, before proceeding:'
49. KIRK HEILBRUN, PRINCIPLES OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT 141- 153
(2001).
50. See generally, Smart Greenberg & Daniel Shuman, Irreconcilable Conflict Between Therapeutic and Forensic Roles, 28 PROF'L PSYCHOL: R.Es. & PRAC. 30 ( 1997); Michael L. Perlin, Powe1·
Imbalances in Therapeutic and Forensic Relationships, 9 B EHAV. Ser. & L. 111 (1991).
51. Or, paradoxically, he may wish to exercise his right to personal autonomy by refusing
certain treatment that his treating mental health professional may recQmmend. See infra Chapter 3.
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By contrast, the forensic mental health assessment is generally initiated by
someone other than the examinee. The court, the attorney, or an agency may
cause the assessment to occur. The examinee's wishes about the assessment may
be of little concern. The assessment is intended to provide information tl1at will
assist a court or administrative body in answering a legal question or establishing
some competency or fitness. The results may specifically tl1wart tl1e aims of tl1e
examinee. Data collected as part of the assessment will necessarily be shared with
others, and the examinee generally has no control over how tl1ey are distributed
or utilized. The cost of the assessment may be borne by tl1e examinee, as in parenting assessments or lifetime assessment oftestamentaty competency, or may be
paid by a party witl1 an opposing interest.
Witl1 these differences driving tl1e forensic assessment, special considerations
are warranted to ensure that tl1e exanunee's rights are not violated and tl1at tl1e resulting opinions are sufficiently reliable and relevant to the court or adnunistrative
body to warrant tl1eir consideration. The forensic assessment is ideally conducted
in an objective, dispassionate way by a neutral examiner who actively seeks data
to confirm or disconfirm each reasonable hypotl1esis. 52 The examiner will not be
preserving a traditional treatment relationslup in providing courtroom testimony,
her courtroom presentation, and traditional concepts of treater confidentiality
are not typically betrayed by the examiner's presentation, 53 a subtle but powerful
52. See, eg., HEILBRUN, supra note 49; and see Greenberg & Shuman, sitpra note 51,
at 56:
Therapists do not ordinarily have the requisite database to testify appropriately about
psycholegal issues of causation (i.e., the relationship of a specific act to claimant's current condition) or capacity (i.e., the relationship of diagnosis or mental status to legally
defined standards offunctional capacity) .
These matters raise problems of judgment, foundation, and historical truth that are
problematic for treating experts.

See also, Committee on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, Specialty Guidelines for
Forensic Psychologists, 16 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 655, 658 (1991) (Guidefu1e IV §A, "Relationships") (Specialty Guidelines):
During initial consultation with the legal representative of the party seeking services,
forensic psychologists have an obligation to inform the parry of factors that might reasonably affect the decision to contract with the forensic psychologist. T hese factors include, but are not li11uted to ... (2) prior and current personal or professional activities,
obligations, and relationships that might produce a conflict of interests.
We use the word "ideally" as a recognition that this goal is not always met. See, eg., Michael L.
Perlin, TherapeuticJurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and Prete.xtual Bases ofMental Disability Law, 20 N. ENG. J. CRIM. & Crv. CONFINEMENT 369, 380-81 (1994) (discussing matter
of Dr. James Grigson, "who testified [in multiple death penalty cases] in defiance of all existing
professional etlucal guidelines").
53. See Kirk Heilbrw1 et al ., Pragmatic Psychology, Forensic Mental Health Assessment, and the
Case of Thomas Johnson, ro PsYCHOL. Pun. PoL'Y & L. 31, 37 (2004):
For example, when performing a court-ordered evaluation, tl1e forensic cfu1ician must
provide the individual being evaluated witl1 basic information regarding (a) tl1e nature
and purpose oftl1e evaluation, (b) who autl10rized tl1e evaluation, and (c) tl1e associated
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consideration in the treating professional's provision of courtroom testimony.54
Matters disclosed in a treatment relationship with no anticipation of litigation
were, undoubtedly, shared without the forewarning that they might be disclosed
in court in a way that could be harmful. Where the treatment professional may
rightly be concerned tl1at the "patient" will feel betrayed when private matters
disclosed in treatment are now revealed during cross-examination, tl1e forensic
examiner has, from the outset, clearly conveyed an absence of confidentiality in
tl1e process of assessment and the potential tl1at anytl1ing disclosed could be used
in court in a way that would compromise tl1e aims oftl1e examinee. 55
The fact finder may believe tl1at treatment providers can offer useful clinical information about someone who is well known to them and tl1at this information,
derived for treatment purposes ratl1er tl1an litigation, is more reliable. The forensic
expert may be viewed as a hired gun, and the treating clinician viewed as a helping professional whose motives are altruistic. However, the treating clinician has
generally not conducted an assessment of tl1e capacities or competencies at question in tl1e legal matter. The careful assessment of relevant capacities, derived from
multiple data sources selected for tl1eir objectivity and reliability, is quite different
from clinical assessment. Clinical assessment, conducted in anticipation of providing remedial intervention, relies principally on tl1e presentation of tl1e patient,
which is assumed to be driven by a wish to get help witl1 symptoms. The clinician,

limits on confi dentiality, including how the individual's informatio n might be used . In
this context, however, the individual's participation in the eval uation is not volw1tary,
and it would therefore be inappropriate fo r the forensic clinician to seek info rmed consent. By contrast, when an attorney retains a forensic clinician to conduct an evaluation of
that attorney's client, the evaluation is volw1tary, and informed consent sho uld therefore
be obtained from the individual before proceeding.

54. When a forensic witness takes the stand, there can be no blanket assurances of confidentiality, and, in anticipation of tfos testimony, the witness ca.imot promise to a.i1 exa.i11inee
that she or he will not disclose certain information. This, of course, is a separate matter fro m
.
attorney-client confidentiality, a topic beyond the scope of this volume.
55. There is a significa.i1t difference between the empathetic ski.Us used in therapeutic relationships a.i1d tJ1e interviews used in fore nsic encow1ters, where the employment of such
empathy may be highly inappropriate. See, e.g., Donald Judges, The Role of Mental Health
Professionals in Capital Punishment: An Exercise in Moral Disengagement, 41 Hous. L. Rev.
515, 589 n.411 (2004), quoting Sniart A. Greenberg & Daniel W Shuman, Irreconcilable
Conflict Betiveen Therapeutic and Forensic Roles, 28 PROF. PSYCHOL.: REs . & PRAc. 50, 53
(1997) (explaining tJ1at while " [t]he tJ1erapist is a care provider and usuaJJy supportive, accepting, a.i1d empathic; the forens ic evaluator is a.i1 assessor and usually neutral, objective, and
? etached as to tJ1e forensic issues"), and Alan M. Goldstein, Overvieiv of Forensic Psychology,
111 11 HANDBOOK OF Ps¥CHOLOGY: FORENSI C PSYCHOLOGY 3, 5 (Ala n M. Go ldstein ed.,
2003) (observing that "in forensic assessments, the motivation [of tJ1e client] to consciously
distort, deceive, or respond defensively is readily apparent " compared to nonforensic clinical
evaluatio ns).
While clinicians should be professionaJJy skilled at drawing people out and invoking dependency md trust, in the forensic exa.i11ination, it may be disingenuous for forensic examiners to
use that posture. See generally, Da.iuel W Shuma.i1, The Use ofEmpathy in Forensic Examinations,
3 fames &BEHAv. 289 (1993).
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wanting to be helpful to the patient and to the court and w1schooled in evidentiary
standards, may stretch to try to answer the question before the court.
Treating clinicians may have information that illwninates some aspect of the
question before the court. Taken for what it is, appropriately limited by the clinician and given the weight it merits by the fact finder, this information may be
salient. The difficulty is that clinicians routinely fail to articulate those limits,
either because they are not asked the relevant questions or because they do not
appreciate the difference between a forensically driven and a clinically driven assessment. Just as routinely, the legal setting calls for the clinician to offer opinions on matters beyond those that the clinical examination addressed. For these
reasons, mental health testimony is sometimes viewed as "jw1k science." 56 The
thoughtfully conducted forensic mental health examination and resultant carefully limited testimony, by contrast, can form reliable and relevant evidence of
direct assistance to the court.

7. Absence of Confidentiality
There is little confidentiality afforded the forensic examinee. The data collected in
tl1e forensic examination forms the basis for expert opinion that is to be offered,
and tbe parties involved have tl1e expectation that tl1ey can probe it for completeness and accuracy. Thus, with limited exceptions, tl1e exan1inee should be led to
w1derstand tl1at tl1ere will be no confidentiality afforded in the assessment process. 57 This runs counter to tl1e expectations generally held about mental healtl1
practitioners-not only examinees, but even cotmsel, may asswne tl1at psychologists, psychiatrists, or cow1selors always keep tl1e confidences of people to whom
tl1ey provide services. When services are provided in the anticipation oflitigation,
tlus is almost never tl1e case.

8. Potential for Outcome to Be Unhelpful or Harmful to the
Examinee's Interests
Clinicians generally are trained to do no harm. The forensic assessment may, however, result in failure to have one's property distributed as one wished, incarceration, involuntary commitment, or, ultimately, even deatl1 - consequences tl1at
might logically be seen by the examinee as quite harmful. How does the forensic
mental healtl1 exanuner reconcile tlus pot_ential harm with principles of non.malfeasance and beneficence?
56. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse ofScientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: TheNeedfor
Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 439 (1997); Mike Redmayne, Expert
Evidence and Scientific Disagreement, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1027 (1997).
57. MELTON ET AL., supra note 38, § 3.04, at 46: "In the purely evaluative relationship,
however [contrasted to the typical therapetuic relationship], confidentiality is close to nonexistent. The clinician-patient privilege does not apply when the clinician-'patient' relationship is
the creature of the court, as is the case with court-ordered evalutions?'
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T he task of the mental health professional who undertakes examinations that
will be relied upon by a court is to conduct the examination in a way that respects
the examinee's autonomy, the system of justice, and the principle of fairness. 58
The examiner has an obligation to carefully assess the relevant capacities, explo re
all rival hypotheses, actively seek data that would test each hypothesis, and arrive
at an objective assessment of the matter. 59 The examiner can then fo rcefully present that finding, disclosing all data w1derlying the opinion and data that argued
fo r a different opinion. What happens beyond that is out of the control of the
examiner, but is in the hands of the fact find er. The o utcome, presumably, is a reflection of how society has construed the issue, rather than how the mental health
professions construe it or how the particular evaluator sees it.
In order to perfo rm forensic mental health assessments, the clinician must accept this dichotomy and adueve some comfort with it. The examiner cannot attempt to thwart justice as the law styles it by offering opinion testimony in order
to achieve a certain outcome for the examinee.60 The evaluation must be done
with neutrality and objectivity rather than from an advocacy stance.

9 • The Special Circumstances of Mandated Reporting
In most jurisdictions, mandated-reporter status requires the examiner to make a
report to authorities when there is a reason to believe abuse or neglect of an elder
or a child has occurred .61 There are generally no exceptions for mental health
professionals. The atto rney may asswne that the retained examiner is working
under the work-product shield and instruct the examiner not to disclose anything about the assessment to anyone without the attorney's express permission,
but this instruction may rw1 counter to the mental health professio nal's legal
58 . American Psychological Association, Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, 57 AM. PSYCHOLOG IST 1060 (2002) (" Principle E: Respect for People's Rights and
Dignity").
. 59 . Specialty Gitidelines, mpra note 52, Guideline VII, Public and Profess io nal Communica1J.ons, (D ) "When testifying, forensic psychologists have an obligation to all parties to a legal
proceeding to present their findings, conclusions, evidence, o r other professional products in a
fair manner. T his principle does not preclude forceful representation of the data and reaso ning
upon which a conclusion or professional produ ct is based. It does, however, precl ude an attempt, whether acti ve o r passive, to engage in partisan distortion or misrepresentation. Forensic
psychologists do no t, by either commission or omission, participate in a rnis representation of
their evidence, nor do they participate in partisan attempts to avoid, deny, or subvert the presentation of evidence contra1y to their own position:'
60. Id.
6 1. Mary Coirnell, et al. , Expert Opinion-Does Mandatory Reporting Trump Attorney-Client
Opinion? 24 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY- LAW SOCIETY NEWS, 10, 15 (2005), accessible at
http: //www.ap-ls.o rg/ pu blicatio ns/ newsletters/ fall2004.pdf and at http: // home.comcast.net/
~slgolding/publications/ Mandated_reporting. htm (both last accessed Jw1e 20, 2007). See generally, Maryairn Zavez, The Ethical and Moral Considerations Presented by Lawyer/ Social Worker
I nterdisciplinary Collaborations, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. Anvoc. 191 , 203 (2005) (on
the questio n of whether mandatory reporting obligations "might still trwn p" what otherwise
would be protected attorney-client commw1ications) .
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and ethical obligation to report. The case of Tarasoffv. Regents of the Universiry of
California62 raises a further potential mandated-reporting requirement in many
jurisdictions. The mental health professional may have a duty to take preventative
measures when it would appear, to a reasonable and competent clinician, that an
examinee is likely to harm another person in the near future. There is generally no
duty unless the potential victim is specifically identifiable. 63 It may be acceptable
to provide the warning by notifying authorities or committing the examinee, or,
in examining an already incarcerated individual, by providing the warning in the
report to be submitted to the court. 64
What, then, must counsel do in securing expertise when there is risk that the
examiner may discover an uncharged offense? And in fact, even details of the
charged offense must, according to the mandated-reporter statute, generally be
reported when they come to the attention of the mandated reporter. In most
states, the statutes do not excuse the mandated reporter from the obligation to
report on the basis that the case is already being investigated by a protective service or public service agency. The statutes are ordinarily construed very simply,
requiring anyone who becomes aware of or has reason to believe a child or adult
is in danger of being abused or neglected, or has been abused or neglected, to
report to the appropriate agency within a specified period of time. 65
62. Tarasoffv. Board of Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
63. Thompson v. County of Alemeda, 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980).
64. See generally, Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff, and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient: N eiv
Directions far the 1990\ 16 LAw & PSYCHOL. R.Ev. 29 (1992); Michael L. Perlin, «You Got No
Secrets to Conceal": Considering the Application ofthe TarasojfDoctrineAbroad, 75 U. CIN. L. R.Ev.
611 (2006).
65. In Texas, by way of example, state family law provides that "[a] person having cause to
believe that a child's physical or mental health or welfare has been adversely affected by abuse
or neglect by any person shall immediately make a report as provided by this subchapter?' Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 261.lOl(a) (Vernon 2002); see White v. State, 50 S.W.3d 31, 47 (Tex.
App.-Waco 2001, pet. ref'd) ("cause" means "sufficient reason"). The same law "imposes a
mandatory requirement upon any person, not merely law enforcement officers, to report child
abuse, whether it is physical abuse, sexual abuse, or other conduct included in the definition of
'abuse."' Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 261.l0l(a); see State v. Harrod, 81 S.W.3d 904, 908 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2002, pet. ref'd) (prosecution for failure to immediately report child sexual abuse),
Rodriguez v. State, 47 S.W.3d 86 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd) (conviction for failure to immediately report child abuse); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. DM-458 (1997)
at 3 (section 261.lOl(a) does not allow sex offender treatment providers to decide whether or
not to report "incomplete or dated" information received from client).
Section 261.lOl(b) of the family law act establishes a specific reporting requirement for
"a professional;' defined as "an individual who is licensed or certified by the state or who is an
employee of a facility licensed, certified, or operated by the state and who, in the normal course
of official duties or duties for which a license or certification is required, has direct contact with
children;' including "teachers, nurses, doctors, d:i:y-care employees, employees of a clinic or
health care facility that provides reproductive services, juvenile probation officers, and juvenile
detention or correctional officers?' (3) Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 261.l0l(b) (Vernon 2002). If
a professional has cause to believe that a child has been abused or neglected or may be abused
or neglected, or that a child is a victim of an offense w1der Section 21.11, Penal Code, and the

Why the Question of Competence Is so Impo rtant

19

From the examiner's perspective, there is arguably ·an obhgation to introduce
this issue during the info rmed consent process with counsel, before the examination begins, so that the attorney can take whatever steps are required in contemplation that the statute may be triggered. Finally, the examiner, in discussing
the contours of the examination with the exan1inee, is duty bound to notify the
examinee of what will be done with any info rmation obtained in the examination,
including that covered w1der mandated-reporter status. 66

10. "Door-Opening Considerations" and the Instant Case
In criminal cases in some jurisdictions, the defendant's examination by a defenseretained mental health expert may "open the door " to a prosecution-retained expert examination. Within this issue, however, is a secondary one. Acting anticipatorily, cow1sel may instruct the defendant not to discuss the instant offense with
the defense expert because to do so would open the door to the exanunation of it
by the prosecution expert. This matter raises both legal and ethical considerations
fo r the fo rensic examiner. It is imperative that cow1sel make the decision about
whether to allow the defendant to discuss the alleged offense- this is a legal matter
and may invoke the defendant's constitutio nal rights against self-incrinunation.67
professional has cause to believe that the child has been abused as defi ned by Section 261.001,
the professional shall make a report not later than the 48th hour after the hour the professional
fi rst suspects that the child has been or may be abused or neglected or is a victim of an offense
tmder Section 21.11 , Penal Code.
See http ://www.oag.state.ex. us/ opi.nions/ op50abbott/ ga-Ol06 .htm (last accessed Ju.ne 20,
2007).
66. APA Ethics Code, 3.10, Info rmed Consent:
(a) When psychologists conduct research or provide assessment, therapy, cotmseling, or
consulting services i.n person or via electronic transmission or other fo rms of communication, they obtain the informed consent of the individual or individuals using
language that is reasonably w1derstandable to that person or persons except when
conducting such activities without consent is mandated by law or governmental
regulation or as otherwise provided in this Ethics Code. (See also Sta.ndards 8.02,
Info rm ed Consent to Research; 9.03, Info rmed Consent in Assessments; and 10.01,
Info rmed Consent to Therapy.)
(b) For persons who are legally inca pable of giving info rmed consent, psychologists
nevertheless (1) provide an appropri ate explanation, (2) seek the individual's assent,
(3) consider such persons' preferences a.nd best interests, and (4) obtain appropriate
permission fro m a legally authorized person, if such substitu te consent is permi tted
or required by law. When consent by a legally authorized person is not permitted or
required by law, psychologists take reasonable steps to protect the i.ndividual's rights
and welfa re.
(c) When psychological services are court ordered or otherwise mandated, psychologists
inform the i.ndividual of the nam re of the anticipated services, including whether
the services are court ordered or mandated and any lim its of confidentiality, before
proceeding.
67. See 4 PERLIN, supra, §§ 10-2 to 2.4a.
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There may be costs to the perceived credibility of the defense retained expert,
however, in not discussing the alleged offense-the fact finder may perceive the
expert as partisan for having failed to do so because of the door-opening potential. 68 This should be counsel's carefully considered determination. 69 When counsel makes the decision, the expert must then determine whether the examination
can be done at all, tmder the terms decided by retaining counsel. If the examiner
believes there is some prohibition to doing an assessment under constrained conditions, this should be revealed as early as possible in the process to allow cow1sel
time to seek another expert. 70

11. Dilemma of the Uncooperative Examinee

"'

The mental health examiner faced with an unwilling or uncooperative exan1inee
must take a number of steps to protect the rights of the examinee and to ensure
that the examination produces useful results. First, no examination should proceed before counsel is available to the examinee, 7 1 and if the co·u rt orders an exanunation to go forth before counsel has had an opportunity to consult with the
examiner and examinee, the exanuner should make known to the court the ethical
obligation to delay the assessment w1til tlus has been accomplished .72 Assuming
tl1at appropriate consideration has been given to tl1e individual's right to consult
witl1 cow1sel and counsel has supported tl1e examination effort and instructed tl1e
examinee to submit to tl1e examination, but tl1e examinee nevertheless fails to cooperate, tl1e examiner carefully considers the next course of action. The examinee
68. See, for example, Specialty Guidelines, supra note 52, Guideline VI, Methods and Procedures, (C), "In providing forensic psychological services, forensic psychologists take special
care to avoid undue influence upon their methods, procedures and products . . .. As an expert
conducting an evaluation, treatment, consultation or scholarly/empirical investigation, the forensic psychologist maintains professional integrity by examining the issue at hand from all
reasonable perspectives, actively seeking information which will differentially test plausible rival
hypotheses:'
69. Mark D. Cunningham, Infanned Consent in Capital Sentencing Evaluations: Targets and
Content, 37 PROF'L PSYCHOL.: REs. & PRAG., 452, 457-458 (2006).
70. Mark D. Clllmingham and Thomas J. Reidy,AMatter ofLife or Death: Special Considerations and Heightened Practice Standards in Capital Sentencing Evaluations. 19 BEHAV. Ser. & L.
473, 485,486 (2001).
71. Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology, supra note 52, Methods and Procedures,
§ D, at 661 :
Forensic psychologists do not provide professional forensic services to a defendant or
to any party in, or in contemplation of, a legal proceeding prior to that individual's
representation by colU1sel, except for persons judicially determined, where appropriate,
to be handling their representation pro se. When the forensic services are pursuant to
court order and the client is not represented ·by colU1sel, the forensic psychologist makes
reasonable efforts to inform the court prior to providing the services.
(See http: //www.ap-ls.org/ links/ currentforensicguidelines.pdf)
72. APA ETHICS CODE, Principle E: Respect far People's Rights and Dignity (2002).
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may need further consultation with cmmsel to be apprised of the potential consequences of not cooperating with the examination .73 Mental health professionals
are not in a position to alert examinees to the potential legal consequences of not
cooperating with an examination and should not attempt to do so.
If the examinee remains uncooperative, the exanuner has next to decide what
to do with the information that has been obtained, including the examinee's resistant behavior and communications. A lack of cooperation often so constricts
available data that no opinion can be offered about the examinee. Sometimes,
however, tlus is not the case. If, for example, an examinee refu ses to cooperate in
a court-ordered exan1ination of competency, but in so doing lays fo rtl1 a coherent and logical set of reasons and demonstrates capacities that bear relevance to
an assessment of competency, the examiner may be in a position to offer opinion
about those specific capacities. There remains tl1e qu estio n whetl1er tl1e exam inee is sufficiently competent to assist counsel in planning his or her own defense,
however, if cow1sel has advised tl1e examinee to cooperate and tl1e examinee has
not done so. Thus, tl1e opinion may be attenuated by furth er explanatio n of tl1e
limits in apparent fimctional capacities making up competency to stand trial, and
tl1e fact find er can tl1en determine whetl1er sufficient info rm ation is available to
make a finding.
Thus far, we h ave explored explicit uncooperativeness. The examinee may,
however, give overt signs of cooperating with tl1e exan1ination but covertly withhold relevant info rmation o r present a skewed picn1re of functioning. This covert
tmcooperativeness is anticipated in most fo rensic assessments. That is, tl1e examinee has a significant stake in tl1e outcome of tl1e assessment and nu ght nantrally
be expected to attempt to control tl1at outcome by feeding the examiner tl1e necessary impression. Impression management is anticipated, and forensic assessment
always includes evaluation of how fo rtl1coming or cooperative tl1e examinee has
been in providing an accurate representation of ftmctioning.74 The assessment of
response style may occur ilirough testing tl1at specifically add resses response style,
tl1rough examination of ilie individual's internal consistency across interviews
and oilier indicia of statements, and d1rough comparison of data obtained fro m
third-party sources.
Impression management may include attempting to feign mental illness or
mental retardation, or otl1er impairment of cognition or behavior. Malingering
73. Specialty Gttidelines for Forensic Psychologists, supra note 52, IV Relationships, (E)(l), 1.
Unless comt ordered, fo rensic psychologists obtain the informed consent of the client or
party, or their legal representative, before proceeding with such evaluations and procedures. If the client appears unwilling to proceed after receiving a thorough notificatio n
of the purposes, methods, and intended uses of the forens ic evaluation, the eval uation
should be postponed and the psychologist should take steps to place the client in contact
with his/ her atto rney for the purpose of legal advice on the issue of participation.
74. H

E I LBRUN,

supra note 49, at 165.
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refers to conscious fabrication or gross exaggeration of symptoms for secondary gain, such as to obtain medication, to avoid responsibility for one's actions,
or to invoke sympathy and nurturing. 75 Conversely, impression management
may be aimed at appearing to have competencies or positive attributes one
does not actually possess. An individual w1dergoing assessment for parenting competency in a child protection proceeding, or in a battle over parenting
time and responsibility at marital dissolution, for exan1ple, may "fake good;'
claiming virn1es or qualities that might favorably affect the outcome of the
assessment.
Impression management may be conscious or w1eonscious. The individual may
be acutely aware of the potential importance of the outcome of the assessment
and deliberately present a distorted in1pression, or may habitually attempt to portray an exaggeratedly positive image. Consider the person who has difficulty acknowledging any weakness and swaggers self-confidently, with pseudo-bravado,
or tl1e person who simply covers over anxieties and fears. Conversely, picmre tl1e
perpenial victim, who routinely focuses on asswned injuries otl1ers have perpetrated, or aches and pains, seeking the attention that comes from tl1e sympatl1etic
listener. Neitl1er person is consciously attempting to fool the listener, and yet
each presents a distorted picture, exaggerating certain traits while camouflaging
others.
The exanuner makes a routine assessment of this impression management,
or what may at times be covert w1cooperativeness, and incorporates tl1is data
into tl1e overall assessment. Generally, mental health exanuners refrain from concluding tl1at someone is deliberately lying, or is deceitful, but ratl1er attempt to
explicate any apparent distortions and offer hypotl1eses about possible bases for
the distortion. 76

12. Conclusion
In smnmary, the courts rely upon mental health expertise in competence determination, and this contribution is enhanced by adl1erence to general etl1ical
principles of beneficience or nonmalfeasance, respect for tl1e rights and dignity
of the examinee, and regard for tl1e system of justice witlun which tl1e examination occurs. Forensic exan1inations represent a wuque kind of mental healtl1
service, posing challenges to tl1e examiner and raising concerns not always an75. Richard Rogers, Introduction, in CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERlNG AND DE1, 11 (Richard Rogers ed., 2d ed. 1997). On the "case" with which skilled clinicians
can detect malingerers, see Perlin, supra note 18, at 236-37; Michael L. Perlin, «There's No Success Like Failure/ and Failure's No Success at All": Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks,
92 Nw. U. L. REv. 1247, 1259 (1998) .
76. Rogers, supra note 75, at 11 (hypotheses could include a range of possible response
styles including malingering, defensiveness, irrelevant responding, random responding, honest
responding, and hybrid responding).
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ticipated by the court or counsel. The defendant, whose capacity to make informed •-and voluntary decisions may be limited, requires the protection of early
notification to cow1sel of elements of the examination process that invoke special consideration. The examination that follows is ideally an objective, neutral, and thorough consideration of relevant and, where possible, reliable data
that is synthesized or integrated to address fi.mctional capacities at issue in the
court's consideration of competence. The examiner distinguishes between the
beliefs or opinions that flow from that data to form expert opinion and the personally held beliefs or values that are irrelevant to the court. For that reason,
the examiner may describe the elements of an individual's competence without formulating an opinion on whether the person is, by the law's reckoning,
competent.

D. AN INTRODUCTION TO SANISM
AND PRETEXTUALITY
Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character as other irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in prevailing social attitudes of
racism, sexism, homophobia and ethnic bigotry. It permeates all aspects of mental disability law and affects all participants in the mental disability law system:
litigants, fact finders, counsel, and expert and lay witnesses. Its corrosive effects
have warped mental disability law jurisprudence in involuntary civil commitment
law, institutional law, tort law, and all aspects of the crin1inal process (pretrial,
trial, and sentencing). It reflects what civil rights lawyer Flo1ynce Kennedy has
characterized as the "pathology of oppression.'' 77
Pretextuality means that courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial
dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (frequently meretricious) decisionmalcing, specifically when witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a "high
propensity to purposely distort tl1eir testimony in order to achieve desired
ends.'' 78 This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all participants in the judicial
system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for tl1e law, demeans participants, and
reinforces shoddy lawyering, blase judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt testifying. 79
One of the autl1ors of tlus volume (MLP) has explored the relationships be77. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Half Wraclzed Prej14dice Leaped Forth": Sanism, Pretextuality,
and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed.As It Did, 10 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
3 (1999); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, Turn HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON ThIAL
(2000);Perlin, Lepers, supra note 14; Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 S.M.U L. REv. 373
(1992).
78. Mid1ael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of"Ordinary Common
Sense/ He14ristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BuLL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
131, 135 (1991).
.
79. See generally, PERLIN, supra note 77.
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tween sanism and pretextuality in matters involving, inter alia, competency to stand
trial, 80 sexual autonomy, 81 the right to refuse treatment, 82 autonomous decisionmaking,83 and competency to plead guilty or waive counsel. 84 In this volume,
we will demonstrate how these factors are relevant to - and, in some instances,
control-virtually all jurisprudential developments.

80. Eg., Michael L. Perlin,"Everything's a Little Upside DoJVn, As a Matter ofFact the Wheels
Have Stopped)): The Fraudulence ofthe Incompetency Evaluation Process, 4 HOUSTON J. HEALTH L.
& PoL'Y 239 (2004); Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability LaJV: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 625 (1993).
81. Eg., Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond
the Last Frontier? 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc'L CHANGE 302 (1993-94).
82. Eg., Mid1ael L. Perlin, '½nd My Best Friend, .My Doctor/ Won't Even Say What It Is Pve
Got: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases:' 42 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 735 (2005); Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, "Is It More Than Dodging Lions
and Wastin' Time?)) Adequacy of Counsel, Q;1estions of Competence, and the Judicial Process in Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOLOGY, Pun. PoL'Y & L.114 (1996 ).
83 . E.g., Perlin, Lepers, supra note 13.
84. Eg., Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity Was the First to Leave)): Godinez v. Moran, Colin Ferguson, and the Trial ofMentally Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14 B EHAV. Ser. & L. 61 (1996).

